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Abstract
We discuss Bayesian inference for parameters selected using the data. We argue that, in
general, an adjustment for selection is necessary in order to achieve approximate repeated-
sampling validity, and discuss two issues that emerge from such adjustment. The first one
concerns a potential ambiguity in the choice of posterior distribution. The second one con-
cerns the choice of non-informative prior densities that lead to well-calibrated posterior
inferences. We show that non-informative priors that are independent of the sample size
tend to overstate regions of the parameter space with low selection probability.
Keywords: Bayesian inference; condition on selection; prior; selective inference.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of providing Bayesian inference in situations where the parameter on
which inference is performed is selected using the same data. A typical example of this situation
involves N independent observations from distributions with N different parameters. If N is
large, we may decide to provide inference only for those parameters that appear to be more
interesting based on the sample. For instance, we may want to study only the parameters that
gave the largest K sample means, for some K < N .
A crucial realisation in statistical inference is that, in repeated sampling from a model involving
selection, the distribution of the data corresponding to the experiments that lead to a specific
parameter being selected depends, in general, on the selection mechanism. This issue has clear
implications in the frequentist paradigm and has been extensively investigated in the literature.
Of the techniques proposed to counteract selection effects, one that has received considerable
attention due to its firm theoretical justification is the so called conditional approach, which
advocates basing inference for selected parameters on the conditional distribution of the data
given selection; see Fithian et al. (2017) and Kuffner and Young (2018).
The Bayesian standpoint regarding selection is less clear. The classical view is that inference
should not be altered by selection. The argument is that, since Bayesian inference operates
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conditionally on the data, in particular it conditions on the selection event, which is therefore
automatically accounted, as explained by Dawid (1994). This viewpoint was however questioned
by Yekutieli (2012), who provided a clarifying analysis of the issue and argued that in some
situations the posterior distribution has to be appropriately modified in the presence of selection.
In this paper we argue that, in situations where the selection bias is pronounced, correcting for it
is necessary for posterior claims to remain well calibrated from a repeated-sampling perspective,
which we view as a necessary condition for inferential validity. Selection-adjusted posterior
inference is derived by constructing the posterior density using the likelihood of the conditional
distribution of the data given selection, in the same vein as the fixed-parameter correction
proposed by Yekutieli (2012), and is therefore very closely related to the frequentist conditional
approach.
The paper has three main objectives. The first is to analyse the Bayesian conflict regarding
correct inference in the presence of selection (section 2). Our analysis takes inspiration from the
ideas developed by Yekutieli (2012), but we adopt a somewhat different viewpoint to motivate
the conditioning. The second goal is to draw attention to the need for careful thought in the
determination of the conditioning event. We will see that the same selection algorithm can lead
to different conditional models, some of which are more appropriate than others. This issue is
discussed in section 3. In the final part (section 4) we explore choices of non-informative priors for
selection-adjusted posteriors in simple settings. We propose the use of either a data-dependent
prior, which by construction achieves the appropriate frequentist probability matching, or a
Jeffreys prior, constructed from the selective likelihood, which provides similar results and is
easier to implement.
1.1 Framework and notation
The settings we are going to consider in this work can be formalised as follows. Suppose we
have data Y whose distribution has a density or probability mass function f(y; θ), y ∈ Y, known
up to a finite-dimensional parameter θ ∈ Θ, and that there exists a potential parameter of
interest, ψ ≡ ψ(θ), that may be selected for future study after observing the data, possibly by
an artificially randomised procedure. More precisely, we assume that there exists a function p(y)
taking values in [0, 1] and determined prior to the data collection, such that, having observed
Y = y, inference on ψ is performed with probability p(y). The function p(y), which fully
characterises the selection mechanism, will be referred to as the selection function. The following
examples illustrate this framework.
Example 1.1. Let Y1 ∼ N(θ, 1), and suppose that we are only interested in θ if we suspect that
it is greater than zero. To determine this we run the test Y1 > 2 and, if we observe y1 > 2, we
collect a second sample Y2 ∼ N(θ, 1), independent of the first one, that we use to gain further
information about θ. We therefore have Y = (Y1, Y2) and p(y1, y2) = 1(y1 > 2). Henceforth we
use 1(A) to denote the indicator function of the event A.
Example 1.2. There are N treatments for a given disease, with unknown effects θ1, . . . , θN .
These treatments are tested, and the most promising one is put forward for further study. In the
testing stage we get to observe Yi = θi + εi for i = 1, . . . , N , where the errors are independent
and identically distributed according to a certain known distribution. After this, a second test
is carried on the parameter that gave the largest yi, which we may assume to be the first one
without loss of generality. Denote this sample by Y ′1 . At the end, the whole data vector is
Y = (Y1, Y
′
1 , Y2, . . . , YN ), and the selection function is p(y1, y
′
1, . . . , yN ) = 1(y1 = max{yi}).
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Example 1.3. Let Y ∈ Rn and X ∈ Rn×m denote a response vector and a matrix of covariates,
respectively. Suppose that from the original set of covariates, only a small number are selected for
inclusion in a regression model, and denote the design matrix which includes only the selected
covariates by X ′. Assume also that we decide to analyse the fixed design linear model Y ∼
N(X ′β, σ2In), with β the parameter of interest and σ
2 a nuisance parameter. In this case, we
decide to provide inference for ψ = β only upon observing a particular event y ∈ E, comprised
of all data points that would have led to the selection of that particular set of covariates, given
the original design matrix X. Therefore, the selection function is p(y) = 1(y ∈ E).
2 The conditional approach to selective inference
Different approaches to inference lead to two opposing views as to the correct analysis of the
data in the presence of selection. On the one hand, frequentist methods evaluate the accuracy
of inferential procedures with respect to the sampling distribution of the data. Since selection
modifies the sampling distribution by favouring data points with higher selection probability, it
is clear that this reported accuracy should be appropriately modified. For example, the mean
squared error of an estimator should be evaluated with respect to the conditional distribution
of the data given selection. On the other hand, subjective Bayesians adopt the view that, once
the data has been observed, the recognition that a different realisation could have resulted in
a different inferential problem, or in no problem at all, should have no effect on the inference.
This discrepancy is discussed in detail by Dawid (1994).
In the frequentist literature, the first viewpoint has led to the development of the conditional
approach to selective inference, which advocates that inference for ψ should be based on the
conditional distribution of the data given the event that selection took place. In our notation,
this distribution has density
fS(y; θ) =
f(y; θ)p(y)
ϕ(θ)
, (1)
where the normalising constant ϕ(θ) is the probability that ψ gets selected when θ is the true
parameter. We will refer to the conditional distribution of Y given selection as the selective
distribution.
Basing inference on (1) ensures that, under repeated sampling, if we only report inferences
for those samples that get selected, probabilistic statements are well calibrated, in the sense
that the error assessments are accurate. This approach has attracted much attention recently,
particularly in the context of variable selection for linear models. Some notable references in-
clude Lockhart et al. (2014); Loftus and Taylor (2014); Lee and Taylor (2014); Lee et al. (2016);
Tibshirani et al. (2018); and Hyun et al. (2018). A unified theory of conditional selective infer-
ence is described in Fithian et al. (2017) and framed within Fisherian statistical thought by
Kuffner and Young (2018).
Conditioning on selection can be understood in terms of information splitting. Let R be the
random variable that takes the value 1 if ψ gets selected and 0 otherwise. That is, R|{Y =
y} ∼ Bernoulli(p(y)). Following Fithian et al. (2017), the data-generating process of Y may be
thought of as consisting of two stages. In the first stage, the value of R, r say, is sampled from
its marginal distribution, and in the second, Y is sampled from the conditional distribution
Y |{R = r}. Since it is R that determines whether we are going to provide inference for ψ or
not, inference based on information revealed in stage two is necessarily free of any selection bias,
because it removes the information about the parameter provided by R. From this viewpoint,
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conditioning on selection may be regarded as a refined form of data splitting, where R constitutes
the “training” data.
Traditionally, the subjective Bayesian viewpoint has been that inference should be unaffected
by selection. However, this view can sometimes be in conflict with the widely accepted principle
that any mode of inference has to be well-calibrated in the sense that the reported accuracy of the
inferences should approximately match the actual one in the long term; see Bayarri and Berger
(2004). To avoid this issue, following the previous discussion, it is natural to consider posterior
inference based only on the information provided by Y given R. If the density pi(θ) represents
our prior beliefs about θ, selection-free Bayesian inference may be provided via the posterior
distribution with density
piS(θ|y) ∝ pi(θ)fS(y; θ). (2)
We will throughout refer to posteriors of this form as selective posteriors. Inference based on
selective posteriors allows the injection of prior information while avoiding potential problems
arising from selection. These type of posterior densities are discussed by Bayarri and DeGroot
(1987) and Bayarri and Berger (1998). They also appear, in a different context, in Bayarri and Berger
(2000), where they are referred to as “partial posterior densities”.
More recently, Yekutieli (2012) has argued that posterior (2) is the “correct” posterior density
in some contexts. Yekutieli identifies two types of parameter, according to how it is affected
by selection. Assuming pi(θ) is the genuine marginal density of the parameter, θ is said to be
random when the joint sampling scheme for the parameter and data is such that pairs (θ, Y )
are jointly sampled from pi(θ)f(y; θ) until selection occurs, and fixed when θ is sampled from its
marginal distribution, held fixed, and Y is sampled from f(y; θ) until selection occurs (mixed
parameters are also possible, but will not be discussed here). For a random parameter, its
conditional distribution given Y = y is
pi(θ|y) ∝ pi(θ|r)f(y|r; θ) ∝ pi(θ)f(y; θ), (3)
while that for a fixed parameter is
pi(θ|y) ∝ pi(θ)f(y|r; θ) = pi(θ)fS(y; θ). (4)
Hence, in the first case selection does not have an effect on the posterior, but in the second one
it does, and coincides with (2). Panigrahi and Taylor (2018) and Panigrahi et al. (2020) have
proposed approximations of (2) for regression models for which the selection probability ϕ(θ) is
difficult to compute exactly.
While the posterior densities (3) and (4) are formally correct given the respective sampling
mechanisms, our view is that it is not clear that a parameter can be labelled as random or
fixed without explicit consideration of this sampling process, which is to some extent arbitrary.
However, this distinction is clarifying, in that it captures the two types of bias that can arise
because of selection. The first occurs when the same parameter is analysed multiple times: if
some of the analyses are not reported because the parameter did not appear to be significant in
light of the data, the published reports about it will on average overstate this significance. The
second one is a bias in the parameter space: parameters that are in some way significant are
more likely to be selected for inference than those which are not. Only the former bias, which
in principle any parameter is subject to, is problematic regarding the correct calibration of the
inferential statements. The motivation for using posterior (2) is that it counteracts this bias if
it were ever to arise, and remains valid if it does not. To illustrate these ideas let us consider
the following model.
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Example 2.1. Let Y1, Y2 ∼ N(θ, 1/n) independently, with n = 20 and selection event Y1 >
2n−1/2. The prior distribution of θ is the standard Laplace distribution. We consider three
possible posterior distributions:
piA(θ|y) ∝ pi(θ)f(y1, y2; θ);
piB(θ|y) ∝ pi(θ)f(y2; θ);
piC(θ|y) ∝ pi(θ)f(y1, y2|Y1 > 2n
−1/2; θ).
The first is the usual posterior, the second corresponds to using only the information provided
by the second sample, and the third to using Y2 and the information left in Y1 after taking out
the information provided by the random variable 1(Y1 > 2n
−1/2). We generated 104 pairs of
(θ, Y ) under the random-parameter sampling regime, and for each pair computed three credible
intervals, from the 0.05 and 0.95 quantiles of each posterior. We know that the repeated-sampling
coverage of piA is equal to the nominal one (0.9) by definition. The estimated coverages of piB
and piC were both 0.89. Furthermore, the average lengths of the intervals were 0.52, 0.73, and
0.55, respectively, so averaged over the prior, the loss of information resulting from conditioning
on selection has a minimal impact on the power.
Now, if instead of averaging the results over the prior, we compute them for fixed values of the
parameter, we observe the behaviour shown in Figure 1. For large values of θ, all possibilities
give a reasonably good coverage. However, if θ is small, corresponding to a lower selection
probability, the actual coverage of piA (blue) is significantly lower than the nominal one, while
the other two options remain well-calibrated. This sharp behaviour makes the “true” posterior
more sensitive to prior misspecification in a random-parameter regime. In addition, there is gain
in inferential power obtained by using piC (orange) instead of piB (green), as can be appreciated
in the second plot. For small values of θ, the intervals derived from piC widen to account for
the selection effect, but as θ increases, piC is able to shrink by using the leftover information
available in Y1|Y1 > 2n
−1/2, while piB does not. If θ is very large, selection has a negligible effect
in the model and the results of posteriors piA and piC are virtually identical. All figures were
estimated from 104 repetitions.
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Figure 1: Coverage and average lengths of 0.9-credible intervals derived from posteriors piA
(blue), piB (green), and piC (orange).
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3 Ambiguity in the choice of selective distribution
The conditional approach to selective inference is usually presented as straightforward to apply
from a conceptual perspective (though actually implementing it may be far from trivial); if we
know the selection event, and are comfortable with a particular sampling model for the data, then
the selective distribution (1) is unequivocally determined. In this section we argue that, just as
the determination of an appropriate sampling distribution in classical statistics is generally not
a trivial issue, so is the appropriate choice of the conditional distribution for selective inference,
in some circumstances. To motivate the discussion, let us consider the following example.
Example 3.1. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be a random sample from a N(θ, 1) distribution, and suppose
that the sample size n > 1 has been sampled from some known distribution fN (n). In the
same spirit as in example 1.1, we decide to split the data into two sets, of sizes n1 = [n/2] and
n2 = n− n1, say, and use the first of them to decide whether θ is likely to be greater than zero,
by checking the condition y1 + . . . + yn1 > 2n
1/2
1 . In the joint model for (N,Y1, . . . , YN ), with
selection function p(n, y1, . . . , yn) = 1(y1+ . . .+ yn1 > 2n
1/2
1 ), the conditional distribution of the
full data given selection has density
fS(n, y1, . . . , yn; θ) =
fN (n)f(y1, . . . , yn|n; θ)p(n, y1, . . . , yn)∑
n˜>1 fN(n˜)Φ(θn˜
1/2
1 − 2)
,
where Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function. In this model the sample size is not
independent of θ. Its density is given by
fS(n; θ) =
fN(n)Φ(θn
1/2
1 − 2)∑
n˜>1 fN(n˜)Φ(θn˜
1/2
1 − 2)
.
The intuitive reason is that, if the true θ is smaller than zero, we have a higher chance of falsely
concluding that θ > 0 if we have a noisier sample (if n is small), and vice versa. Therefore,
posterior inference based on this sampling model would make use of the sample size distribution,
and would arrive to a different conclusion had the sample size been decided in advance by the
statistician rather than random, which appears counter-intuitive. Instead, it is more reasonable
(and would presumably be done in practice without thinking about it) to work with the model
fS(n, y1, . . . , yn; θ) =
fN (n)f(y1, . . . , yn|n; θ)p(n, y1, . . . , yn)
Φ(θn
1/2
1 − 2)
.
This model conditions on selection after the sample size has been observed, which therefore
remains independent of the parameter after conditioning. This reflects more closely the selection
process, since the selection test was designed to achieve a certain significance level conditionally
on n1 for any possible value of n1. That is, the information about θ in the selection step is
interpreted according to the conditional model Y1, . . . , YN |N .
The analysis of example 3.1 suggests that in models that admit ancillary statistics, that is
statistics with distribution not depending on the parameter, it may be more coherent to condition
on selection after conditioning on the observed value of the ancillary. Let us suppose that
the sampling model is such that the data Y can be reduced to a minimal sufficient statistic
(T,A), where A is ancillary. In such circumstances, the conditionality principle asserts that the
information provided by Y about θ is equivalent to that provided by T given the observed value
of A; see Birnbaum (1962). If the selection process complies with this principle, information
about θ in the selection stage ought to be interpreted via the conditional distribution T |A, and
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thus it is more reasonable to define the selective density as
fS(t, a; θ) =
f(a)f(t|a; θ)p(t, a)
ϕ(θ; a)
rather than
fS(t, a; θ) =
f(a)f(t|a; θ)p(t, a)
ϕ(θ)
,
where p(t, a) is the selection probability given (T,A) = (t, a), independent of θ by sufficiency,
and ϕ(θ; a) =
∫
t f(t|a; θ)p(t, a)dt is the selection probability given A = a when θ is the true
parameter.
Example 3.2. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be a random sample from a location model with density f(yi; θ) =
g(yi − θ), θ ∈ R. It is widely agreed that sample evidence about θ should be interpreted via
the conditional distribution of θˆ given A, where θˆ is the maximum likelihood estimator of θ and
A = (Y1 − θˆ, . . . , Yn − θˆ) is the configuration ancillary. The density of θˆ|{A = a} admits the
simple expression
f(z|a; θ) = c(θ, a)
n∏
i=1
g(z + ai − θ),
where c(θ, a) is a normalising constant. Suppose θ is selected for inference if the p-value
u(θˆ, a) = c(0, a)
∫ ∞
θˆ
n∏
i=1
g(z + ai)dz
is below some level α. Then, the selective density of (θˆ, A) should be
fS(z, a; θ) =
f(a)c(θ, a)
∏n
i=1 g(z + ai − θ)p(z, a)
Pθ(u(θˆ, a) ≤ α|a)
,
where p(z, a) = 1(u(z, a) ≤ α).
A parallel case can be made about some models involving nuisance parameters. Suppose that
θ = (ψ,χ), where ψ is the potential parameter of interest and χ is a nuisance parameter. In
these models it is sometimes possible to identify a minimal sufficient statistic (T,A) such that
the distribution of T |A is independent of χ and the distribution of A is independent of ψ. In
such cases, a natural extension of the conditionality principle asserts that information about ψ
should be interpreted as coming from the conditional model T |A; see Cox and Hinkley (1974).
As before, if the selection process interprets the sample information about ψ via the conditional
distribution T |A, we argue that it is more natural to define the selective density as
fS(t, a; θ) =
f(a;χ)f(t|a;ψ)p(t, a)
ϕ(ψ; a)
rather than
fS(t, a; θ) =
f(a;χ)f(t|a;ψ)p(t, a)
ϕ(ψ,χ)
.
Here we are using the same notational convention as before. The number of settings that admit
such a convenient decomposition is admittedly fairly small, but a class of them arises frequently
in selective inference, namely those in which one has independent datasets relative to different
parameters and chooses which parameter, or parameters, to provide inference for on the basis of
some performance statistic. For example, we may choose the parameter that yielded the largest
sample mean. The following example is a simple instance of such scenario, but the discussion
applies in more general settings.
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Example 3.3. Consider the setting of example 1.2, and as before let us assume that the selected
parameter for the given sample is θ1. We can identify two natural sampling mechanisms that
are consistent with selection of the first mean. In the first one, the whole vector (Y1, . . . , YN ) is
sampled until Y1 is observed to be the maximum. The corresponding density of this generative
process is
fS(y1, y
′
1, y2 . . . , yN ; θ) =
f(y′1; θ1)
∏N
i=1 f(yi; θi)1(yi = max{yi})
Pθ(Y1 > Yi ∀ i > 1)
. (5)
The second sampling mechanism is that in which (Y2, . . . , YN ) is sampled from its uncondi-
tional distribution, and conditionally on its observed value, Y1 is sampled until it exceeds
max(y2, . . . , yN ). The density of the data under this model is
fS(y1, y
′
1, y2 . . . , yN ; θ) =
f(y′1; θ1)
∏N
i=1 f(yi; θi)1(yi = max{yi})
Pθ(Y1 > Yi ∀ i > 1|y2, . . . , yN )
. (6)
In the first model, conditioning on selection breaks the independence structure of the data.
As a consequence, the observations from the non-selected parameters depend on θ1, and the
marginal distribution of Y1 depends on θ2, . . . , θN . This makes manipulation of the likelihood
function awkward and computationally expensive if N is large, despite the apparent simplicity
of the problem. One could nevertheless argue that it is appropriate to condition on the observed
values of Y2, . . . , YN , on the basis that they only depend mildly on the parameter of interest.
However, if selection is used to determine whether θ1 is the largest θi, and since the observed
values of Y2, . . . , YN do not provide any direct information about this fact, preference of (6) over
(5) can be justified without resorting to computational considerations.
This argument can also be invoked to justify conditioning on the design matrix in a regression
problem such as that of example 1.3. In a fixed design setting, if the variable-selection algorithm
operates conditionally on the design matrix, the selection event should be conditioned on after
conditioning on the design matrix, so the selective analysis is also a fixed design one.
4 Non-informative priors for selective posteriors
Non-informative priors allow the derivation of posterior distributions without explicitly incorpo-
rating any prior information about the parameter. They serve different purposes: the resulting
posterior can be employed as a reference against which posteriors derived from subjective priors
can be compared in order to assess their impact; they can be used to derive frequentist methods
that retain some of the appealing properties of Bayesian methods, such as good conditional
performance; or allow to carry out an analysis when very little prior information is available. A
common requirement for these priors is that they lead to posterior claims about the parameter
of interest that hold up to a repeated-sampling scrutiny from the data-generating model. More
precisely, they are required to satisfy
Pθ{ψ ≤ Π
−1(α|Y )} = α+ ε(α, θ), (7)
where Π(ψ|Y ) is the marginal posterior distribution function of ψ and ε(α, θ) is small. In the
context of conditional selective inference, condition (7) is required to hold with respect to the
conditional distribution of the data given selection.
In non-selective regimes involving independent and identically distributed observations from a
regular model, this quantile-matching requirement holds with an error decreasing at rate n−1/2
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for any prior that places positive probability around the true parameter, where n is the sample
size. In addition, certain priors, known as probability-matching priors, improve on this error rate,
lowering it to n−1 in general, and to n−3/2 for some distributions; see Datta and Mukerjee (2004).
However, these priors are typically developed in settings with normal asymptotic behaviour, and
selective models are not in general asymptotically normal.
In the selective inference context, it is argued in Yekutieli (2012) that non-informative priors
should not be altered in the presence of selection. So, for example, for a selective normal-
location model, the improper uniform prior pi(θ) ∝ 1 is suggested. This prior is also used by
Panigrahi and Taylor (2018). Our view is that, if a non-informative prior choice depends on
the data-generating process, it should be appropriately modified in the presence of selection.
For instance, a location model truncated to a non-trivial event is no longer a location model,
so the uniform prior for the location parameter cannot be justified via standard arguments
such as invariance. Regarding probability-matching properties, the following lemma shows that
posterior distributions for a normal-location parameter based on the uniform prior consistently
overemphasise regions of the parameter space with low selection probability, and that confidence
bounds derived from them can be dramatically misbehaved. The proof of the result can be found
in the appendix.
Lemma 1. Let Y ∼ N(θ, σ2), with σ2 > 0 known, and p(y) = 1(y > t) for some fixed t ∈ R, and
let Π(θ|Y ) be the selective posterior distribution given Y based on the uniform prior pi(θ) ∝ 1.
Then,
Pθ{θ ≤ Π
−1(α|Y )|S} < α ∀(α, θ) ∈ (0, 1) × R,
and Π−1(α|Y ) does not have a first order moment for any 0 < α ≤ 1/2 and any true θ.
Generalising from the proof of Lemma 1, it can be shown that in a conditional normal-location
model exact probability matching can only be achieved with a data-dependent prior. Consider
the model Y ∼ N(θ, σ2) with an arbitrary selection function p(y), where σ2 > 0 known. The
p-value function,
H(θ, Y ) =
∫∞
Y φ(σ
−1(y˜ − θ))p(y˜)dy˜∫∞
−∞ φ(σ
−1(y˜ − θ))p(y˜)dy˜
,
is uniformly distributed over (0, 1) when θ is the true parameter value, where φ is the standard
normal density. Furthermore, for any observed value y in the interior of the support of p(y), it
is easy to check that θ → H(θ, y) is a distribution function. Hence, if we differentiate it with
respect to θ and divide it by the likelihood, we obtain a formal data-dependent prior density
that gives exact quantile-matching when combined with the likelihood. The resulting prior is
piy(θ) ∝ −
∂
∂θH(θ, y)
∂
∂yH(θ, y)
∝
∫∞
y
{
σ−2(y˜ − θ)− ∂∂θ logϕ(θ)
}
φ(σ−1(y˜ − θ))p(y˜)dy˜
φ(σ−1(y − θ))
, (8)
where, as usual, ϕ(θ) =
∫∞
−∞ σ
−1φ(σ−1(y˜ − θ))p(y˜)dy˜. Furthermore, this is the only sensible
prior that satisfies the quantile-matching requirement for every θ. This follows from the matching
equation
Pθ {Π(θ|Y ) ≤ α|S} = α, α ∈ (0, 1).
Since the model is stochastically increasing in θ, Π(θ|y) has to be a decreasing function of y for
every θ. Denoting its inverse with respect to y by lθ(α), we have that
Pθ {Y ≥ lθ(α)|S} = H{θ, lθ(α)} = α, α ∈ (0, 1).
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Letting α = Π(θ|y) gives the equality. Priors of the form (8) are discussed in Fraser et al. (2010).
In general, these priors do not admit a simple closed expression, and evaluating them requires
numerical evaluation of several integrals. This is naturally not a problem for inference in this
particular model, as we could use directly H(θ, y), but may be problematic when generalising
it to other settings. To this end, we also consider the Jeffreys prior of the conditional model,
given by
piJ(θ) ∝
{
1
σ2
+
∂2
∂θ2
logϕ(θ)
}1/2
. (9)
As we will see, this prior provides good matching properties and is easier to evaluate in some
contexts.
As a basic class of selective inference models let us consider settings involving n independent
observations Y
(j)
i ∼ N(θ, 1), with i = 1, . . . , nj , j = 1, 2, and n1 + n2 = n, where the first set of
observations, corresponding to j = 1, is used for selection, in the sense that θ gets selected if and
only if (Y
(1)
1 , . . . , Y
(1)
n1 ) ∈ E ⊆ R
n1 for some prespecified event E, and the rest of the observations
are used only in the inferential stage, should selection occur. As in the non-selective case,
the conditional model (Y
(1)
1 , . . . , Y
(1)
n1 , Y
(2)
1 , . . . , Y
(2)
n2 )|{(Y
(1)
1 , . . . , Y
(1)
n1 ) ∈ E} can be reduced by
sufficiency to the selective model involving a single observation Y = γY¯ (1)+(1− γ)Y¯ (2) and the
selection function p(y) = P{(Y
(1)
1 , . . . , Y
(1)
n1 ) ∈ E|Y = y}, where γ = n1/n and Y¯
(j) is the sample
average of the j-th set of observations. Note that the case γ = 1 corresponds to a situation where
we have access to all the data during the selection stage, while the case 0 < γ < 1 corresponds
to a data-splitting scenario.
In this setting, if the selection condition is of the form Y¯ (1) > t for some threshold t, the
probability-matching prior (8) is given by
piy(θ) ∝ 1−
h1(n
1/2θ)
h1(n1/2(θ − y))
when γ = 1, and by
piy(θ) ∝
γ1/2
φ(n
1/2
1 (θ − t))
φ(n1/2(θ − y))
×
{
1− Φ
{
n1/2(y − θ + γ(θ − t))
(1− γ)1/2
}
−
∫∞
y n
1/2φ(n1/2(y˜ − θ))p(y˜)dy˜
Φ(n
1/2
1 (θ − t))
}
+Φ
{
n
1/2
1 (y − t)
(1− γ)1/2
}
(10)
when 0 < γ < 1, and the Jeffreys prior (9) is given by
piJ(θ) ∝
{
1 + γh2(n
1/2
1 (θ − t))
}1/2
,
where
h1(x) =
φ(x)
Φ(x)
;
h2(x) = −xh1(x)− h1(x)
2;
are the first two derivatives of log Φ(x). The derivation of prior (10) can be found in the
appendix. The other two cases follow directly from the definitions. Both priors depend on the
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Figure 2: Left: uniform prior (black), probability-matching prior for y = 0 (red), and Jeffreys
prior (blue) for the normal model. Right: the resulting posteriors for y = 0 (the red density
overlaps the blue one in this panel).
Table 1: Estimated coverages of (−∞,Π−1(α|Y )] for the normal-location model derived from
the uniform (U) and Jeffreys (J) priors.
α 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95
Prior U J U J U J U J U J U J U J
θ = −0.5
γ = .5 .045 .049 .092 .099 .237 .250 .487 .501 .742 .751 .896 .901 .948 .950
γ = .75 .035 .047 .075 .096 .209 .247 .458 .502 .724 .754 .889 .903 .944 .952
γ = 1 .020 .051 .041 .098 .110 .234 .250 .465 .448 .714 .637 .879 .738 .938
θ = 0
γ = .5 .043 .049 .088 .099 .228 .248 .473 .498 .730 .750 .890 .901 .945 .950
γ = .75 .038 .050 .077 .099 .199 .243 .427 .492 .693 .748 .872 .901 .935 .952
γ = 1 .033 .056 .065 .108 .161 .251 .331 .477 .537 .710 .709 .868 .794 .929
θ = 0.5
γ = .5 .048 .051 .095 .101 .238 .251 .479 .498 .728 .747 .886 .897 .941 .948
γ = .75 .048 .052 .095 .103 .236 .255 .471 .501 .713 .744 .871 .893 .930 .945
γ = 1 .048 .052 .096 .105 .237 .259 .469 .509 .702 .749 .852 .890 .908 .939
sample size and the selection event, which suggests that this is a necessary condition to achieve
correct frequentist calibration. Figure 2 shows both priors, and the resulting posterior densities,
for n = 20, γ = 0.75, t = 0, and y = 0. The uniform prior and its posterior density is also
plotted for comparison. The posterior densities corresponding to the two proposed priors are
virtually identical, a behaviour that extends to other choices of parameters and observation,
which suggests that Jeffreys prior is well-calibrated from a frequentist viewpoint. Empirical
evidence of this fact can be found in Table 1. The table shows the coverage of the credible
intervals (−∞,Π−1(α|Y )] for this model with n = 20, t = 0, and different combinations of
(θ, γ, α), computed numerically. The posteriors were constructed using the uniform prior (U)
and Jeffreys prior (J). The Jeffreys prior performs better in most cases, and is considerably
superior to the uniform prior when all the data is used for selection (γ = 1).
Consider now a more general setting. Suppose we have a random sample Y1, . . . , Yn from a
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one-parameter exponential family with density or mass function
f(yi; θ) = h(yi) exp {s(yi)θ −A(θ)} .
We assume that the parameter space Θ is open and convex, and that A′′(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
The maximum likelihood estimator of θ in the non-selective model, θˆ = (A′)−1(n−1
∑n
i=1 s(Yi)),
is sufficient for θ without selection. Let us assume that the sample is divided in two sets of sizes
n1 and n2, (Y1, . . . , Yn1) and (Yn1+1, . . . , Yn), with respective maximum likelihood estimators θˆ1
and θˆ2, and that in the selection stage we only have access to the first set of samples. That is,
selection occurs if (Y1, . . . , Yn1) ∈ En1 for some measurable set En1 . Our goal is to devise a prior
pi(θ) that yields good frequentist calibration in the selective model
fS(y1, . . . , yn; θ) =
f(y1, . . . , yn; θ)1{(y1, . . . , yn1) ∈ En1}
ϕn1(θ)
. (11)
Note that, by sufficiency, for any selection event En1 , the selection function of θˆ1, defined as
pn1(z1) = P((Y1, . . . , Yn1) ∈ En1 |θˆ1 = z1), is free of θ. Moreover, by the factorisation theorem, θˆ
is also sufficient for θ in the conditional model (11).
If i(θ) = −Eθ[(∂
2/∂θ2) log f(Yi; θ)] = A
′′(θ) denotes the Fisher information of a single obser-
vation in the non-selective model, any function g(θ) satisfying g′(θ) = i(θ)1/2 is known as a
variance-stabilising transformation, since, by the delta method, n1/2{g(θˆ) − g(θ)}
d
−→ N(0, 1)
as n → ∞. In particular, for i = 1, 2, n
1/2
i {g(θˆi) − g(θ)}
d
−→ N(0, 1) as ni → ∞. Thus, for
large values of n1 and n2, the original selective model is approximately equivalent to a se-
lective normal-location model involving two independent observations, Y1 ∼ N(g(θ), n
−1
1 ) and
Y2 ∼ N(g(θ), n
−1
2 ), and selection function p(y1, y2) = pn1(g
−1(y1)). This heuristic suggests
choosing as a non-informative prior for ψ = g(θ) one that is reliable in the limiting model.
Denoting the chosen prior by piψ(ψ), the resulting prior in the original parametrisation is given
by piθ(θ) ∝ i(θ)
1/2piψ(g(θ)). In view of the previous discussion and the simulation results, it is
natural to take piψ(ψ) to be either the probability-matching prior (8), or the Jeffreys prior (9).
Note that, in the absence of selection, both choices give piψ(ψ) ∝ 1, and piθ(θ) specialises to the
standard Jeffreys prior piθ(θ) ∝ i(θ)
1/2.
As an example, consider providing non-informative Bayesian inference for a selected probability
θ ∈ [0, 1] on the basis of two observations Y1 ∼ Bin(n1, θ) and Y2 ∼ Bin(n2, θ). Initially only
Y1 is observed, and if it satisfies n
−1
1 Y1 ≥ 0.5, the second sample Y2 is collected for inference.
The variance-stabilising transformation of the maximum likelihood estimator in this model is
g(θ) = sin−1(θ1/2). The left panel of Figure 3 shows the standard, non-selective Jeffreys prior
pi(θ) ∝ θ−1/2(1− θ)−1/2, and the two non-informative selective priors for n1 = 8, n2 = 2, y1 = 4,
and y2 = 1. The right panel shows the corresponding posterior densities. As in the normal case,
the two selective priors are almost identical and favour parameter values with large selection
probability.
More formally, let us consider an asymptotic setting in which the selection probability at the
true parameter, ϕn1(θ0), is bounded away from zero as n1 increases. This assumption allows
us to approximate the general conditional model by a normal conditional model around the
true parameter asymptotically. Tian and Taylor (2018) show that consistent inference when
ϕn1(θ0) → 0 is possible, but at the cost of diminishing the power of the selection procedure.
We also assume that the selection condition is of the form
∑n1
i=1 s(Yi) > tn1 for some threshold
tn1 ∈ R, corresponding to a uniformly most powerful test for testing a one-sided hypothesis
about θ, although the analysis extends trivially to similar selection procedures.
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Figure 3: Left: non-selective Jeffreys prior (black), probability-matching prior for y1 = 4 and
y2 = 1 (red), and Jeffreys prior (blue) for the binomial model. Right: the resulting posteriors
(the red lines overlap the blue ones).
The following result states that, under the boundedness condition, the selection probability under
the original model can be uniformly approximated by the selection probability under a normal
model in n
−1/2
1 -neighbourhoods of the true parameter, and that the selective distribution of the
maximum likelihood estimator corresponding to the selection data is asymptotically selective
normal. In what follows, Op(·) and op(·) statements are relative to the selective distribution of
the data. The proof of the result can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 2. Consider the selective exponential model (11) and an arbitrary parameter ψ = g(θ),
with g continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in Θ. Denote by ϕψn1(ψ) = ϕn1(g
−1(ψ))
the selection probability as a function of ψ, and let
ϕ˜ψn1(ψ) = P
(
N
(
ψ,
1
n1iψ(ψ)
)
> g
{
(A′)−1
(
tn1
n1
)})
be the approximation of the selection probability derived by substituting the distribution of ψˆ1 =
g(θˆ1) by its limit as n1 →∞, where iψ(ψ) denotes the single-observation Fisher information in
the ψ-parametrisation. If ϕψn1(ψ0) is bounded away from zero as n1 → ∞, where ψ0 = g(θ0),
then
ϕψn1(ψ0 + n
−1/2
1 t)
ϕ˜ψn1(ψ0 + n
−1/2
1 t)
→ 1 as n1 →∞
uniformly in [−M,M ] for anyM > 0 such that [g−1(ψ0−M), g
−1(ψ0+M)] ⊆ Θ, and Gn1(ψˆ1)
d
−→
U(0, 1) conditionally on selection, where ψˆ1 = g(θˆ1) and Gn1 is the distribution function of a
N(ψ0, (n1iψ(ψ0))
−1) distribution truncated to the interval (g{(A′)−1(n−11 tn1)},∞).
For the variance-stabilising parametrisation ψ, let us consider the posterior density of the local
parameter t = n1/2(ψ − ψ0). Lemma 2 allows us to analyse the asymptotic behaviour of model
(11) via the language of convergence of experiments; see van der Vaart (1998), chapter 9. If
ϕψn1(ψ0) is bounded away from zero, for any convergent sequence tn → t, a Taylor expansion of
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the non-selective component of the log-likelihood gives
log
f(Y1, . . . , Yn;ψ0 + n
−1/2tn)
f(Y1, . . . , Yn;ψ0)
= γ1/2tn
1/2
1 (ψˆ1 − ψ0) + (1− γ)
1/2tn
1/2
2 (ψˆ2 − ψ0)−
t2
2
+ op(1),
as both n1, n2 →∞, where γ = n1/n. The order of error holds unconditionally, and consequently
also conditionally on selection since, for any random variable X and event A, P(|X| > x|A) ≤
P(|X| > x)/P(A). Together with Lemma 2, this remark implies that the log-likelihood ratio of
the selective model satisfies, for any convergent sequence tn → t,
log
fS(Y1, . . . , Yn;ψ0 + n
−1/2tn)
fS(Y1, . . . , Yn;ψ0)
= γ1/2tn
1/2
1 (ψˆ1 − ψ0) + (1− γ)
1/2tn
1/2
2 (ψˆ2 − ψ0)−
t2
2
− log
ϕ˜ψn1(ψ0 + n
−1/2t)
ϕ˜ψn1(ψ0)
+ op(1),
so the dominant term is asymptotically distributed as the log-likelihood ratio of the selec-
tive model with observations Y1 ∼ N(ψ, n
−1
1 ) and Y2 ∼ N(ψ, n
−1
2 ), and selection event Y1 >
g{(A′)−1(n−11 tn1)}.
The following examples illustrate the performance of the proposed non-informative priors in
non-Gaussian settings.
Example 4.1. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be a random sample from an exponential distribution with rate
parameter θ > 0. For this model the variance-stabilising transformation is g(θ) = log(θ). We
consider the selection event θˆ1 > 1, where θˆ1 is the maximum likelihood estimator of θ based on a
subsample of size n1 = 0.8×n. For the simulation we consider the values of n = 10, 30, 80, and for
each sample size we consider three true parameter values defined to satisfy ϕn(θ0) = 0.1, 0.5, 0.9,
corresponding to situations with small, moderate and large selection probabilities respectively.
For each pair (n, θ0), we plot the coverage of the interval (−∞,Π
−1(α|Y1, . . . , Yn)] as a function of
α for the non-selective Jeffreys prior pi(θ) ∝ θ−1 and for the two non-informative priors proposed
in this work. The coverages were approximated via 104 simulations from the conditional model
(Y1, . . . , Yn)|θˆ1 > 1. The results can be found in Figure 5 (Appendix D). The performances of
the selective Jeffreys and probability-matching priors are practically identical and significantly
better than that of the non-selective prior.
Example 4.2. Let Y1, . . . , Yn be a random sample from an inverse Gaussian distribution with
unknown mean θ > 0 and known shape parameter λ = 1, with density
f(yi; θ) =
1
(2piy3i )
1/2
exp
{
−
(yi − θ)
2
2θ2yi
}
.
The variance-stabilising transformation for this model can be seen to be g(θ) = −2θ−1/2, and the
non-selective Jeffreys prior pi(θ) ∝ θ−3/2. We consider the same settings as before. The selection
event is θˆ1 > 1, where θˆ1 is the maximum likelihood estimator of θ based on a subsample of
size n1 = 0.8× n for n = 10, 30, 80, and we define the true values of the parameter in the same
way as before. The results are similar to those of the exponential model. They can be found in
Figure 6 (Appendix E).
14
4.1 Normal distribution with unknown variance
In this subsection we explore an extension of the previous ideas to a model with a nuisance
parameter. Let Y1, . . . , Yn ∼ N(µ, σ
2), where both µ and σ2 are unknown, but only µ is of
direct interest. Suppose that the sample is divided into two sets of sizes n1 and n2, with
respective maximum likelihood estimators θˆ1 = (Y¯1, V1) and θˆ2 = (Y¯2, V2) of θ = (µ, σ
2). In
order to determine whether µ is of interest, we conduct the t-test V
−1/2
1 Y¯1 > n
−1/2
1 t, for some
pre-specified value of t. The selective density of the data is
fS(y1, . . . , yn;µ, σ
2) =
f(y1, . . . , yn;µ, σ
2)1(v
−1/2
1 y¯1 > n
−1/2
1 t)
Pµ,σ2(V
−1/2
1 Y¯1 > n
−1/2
1 t)
.
Note that in the selective model the marginal distribution of V1, with marginal density
fS(v1;µ, σ
2) =
f(v1;σ
2)Pµ,σ2(v
−1/2
1 Y¯1 > n
−1/2
1 t|v1)
Pµ,σ2(V
−1/2
1 Y¯1 > n
−1/2
1 t)
,
depends on µ, even though its non-selective density is free of it. Under selection, small values of
µ favour larger values of V1, corresponding to noisier samples, and vice-versa, analogously to the
situation of example 3.1. Similarly to the univariate case, standard non-informative priors such
as pi(µ, σ2) ∝ σ−1 produce marginal posteriors for µ that overstate, on average, smaller values
of the parameter. To counteract this, we propose the improper prior defined by pi(σ2) ∝ σ−1
and
pi(µ|σ2) ∝
{
1 +
n1
n
h2
(
n
1/2
1 µ
σ
− t
)}1/2
,
which assigns lower prior probabilities to small values of µ relative to σ. The conditional prior of
µ given σ2 is the selective Jeffreys prior of the model Y¯1 ∼ N(µ, n
−1
1 σ
2)|(n
−1/2
1 σt,∞), assuming
σ2 is known, where the selection threshold n
−1/2
1 V
1/2
1 t has been approximated by its asymptotic
limit.
Figure 4 illustrates the performance of this prior under repeated sampling from the selective
model with n1 = 50, n2 = 10, t = 2, and true parameter (µ0, σ
2
0) = (0, 1). The plot shows the
empirical distribution functions of Π(µ0|Y1, . . . , Yn) for the prior pi(µ, σ
2) ∝ σ−1 (orange) and
for the proposed prior (green), as estimated from 5× 103 repetitions. The selection probability
was computed by numerical evaluation of the integral
Pµ,σ2(V
−1/2
1 Y¯1 > n
−1/2
1 t) =
∫ ∞
0
f(v1;σ
2)Φ
{
n
1/2
1
σ
(
µ−
tv
1/2
1
n
1/2
1
)}
dv1,
and the marginal posterior distribution of µ was approximated with a Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm with 5× 103 steps. The results show that the selection-adjusted prior produces posterior
inference with a more reliable frequentist calibration than the unadjusted one.
5 Concluding remarks
Providing valid inference for a selected parameter is a central problem in statistics. The com-
monly accepted notion that Bayesian inference is immune to selection has been recently ques-
tioned by some authors, most notably Yekutieli (2012). In this paper we have argued in favour
of a general selection adjustment of the posterior distribution, which allows the injection of
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Figure 4: Estimated empirical CDFs of Π(µ0|Y1, . . . , Yn) for the prior pi(µ, σ
2) ∝ σ−1 (orange)
and for the proposed prior (green).
prior information while accounting for the selection bias. This adjustment, however, introduces
two difficulties in the analysis, which we have addressed in sections 3 and 4. The first requires
us to think carefully about how the selection mechanism operates, that is, about how it uses
the sample information when determining whether the parameter is selected. The second issue,
concerning the choice of non-informative priors, is partially addressed by asymptotically approx-
imating a generic selective regular model by a selective normal-location model and analysing
the latter. While exact probability matching in these models can only be achieved with a data-
dependent prior, we show that the Jeffreys prior provides essentially the same results, while
being data-free and generally easier to implement. Many important issues remain unsolved,
including the rigorous verification of the heuristic analysis, the extension of the priors to multi-
dimensional settings, and the development of efficient computational methods for implementing
the procedures in complex settings.
Because the conditional approach discards all the information used by the selection mechanism,
it can be very conservative. In frequentist and non-informative Bayesian analyses it can easily
lead to very large confidence, or credible, bounds if all the data is used for selection, as noted
by Fithian et al. (2017) and Benjamini et al. (2019). In a Bayesian setting, prior information
can provide a partial remedy to this issue, but it does not address it on a fundamental level; in
such circumstances, the posterior distribution will be very similar to the prior. The conditional
approach is generally safer to use in scenarios where there is a holdout dataset that is not used
in the selection stage. This includes situations where the data is split into two sets, one of which
is not used to make the selection decision, and also situations where, after selecting a parameter,
we collect more data. In these cases, conditioning on selection provides an elegant refinement to
the standard data-splitting approach, which uses only the holdout data in the inferential stage.
A key assumption in our formulation of the problem, which is prevalent in the conditional
approach literature, is that the selection mechanism is known and fully specified before the
analysis. This enables us to model the situation entirely and pose a well-defined decision problem.
However, while this assumption may be true in some simple settings, in other cases the selection
mechanism may be too complex to be pinned down precisely, or may involve subjective decisions
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from the statistician that cannot be modelled. In these circumstances, even though we may not
be able to fully model the selection mechanism, we may still be able to identify the key part
of it. For example, if we use a variable-selection algorithm to select covariates in a regression
problem, and then choose a model that incorporates the selected covariates in a more subjective
way, we can still condition on the observed output of the variable-selection algorithm. From
this point of view we can argue that the conditional approach is correcting part of the selection
bias. Alternatively, if we do not know the selection event but have some information about it,
we can exploit the Bayesian machinery to allow for random selection mechanisms. For example,
if we believe that a selection event is of the form Y > t but we are uncertain about the value
of t, we can treat it as an unknown parameter, assign a prior distribution to it, and integrate it
out from the selective posterior.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality we may assume that σ2 = 1 and t = 0. Let hi(x) denote the i-th
derivative of log Φ(x) and, for y > 0, define
H(θ, y) = Pθ(Y ≥ y|Y > 0) =
Φ(θ − y)
Φ(θ)
,
which is a distribution function as a function of θ, and
g(θ; y) = −
∂
∂θH(θ, y)
∂
∂yH(θ, y)
= 1−
h1(θ)
h1(θ − y)
> 0.
This function is strictly increasing. Indeed,
g′(θ; y) =
h1(θ)h2(θ − y)
h1(θ − y)2
−
h2(θ)
h1(θ − y)
,
which is positive if
h2(θ − y)
h1(θ − y)
>
h2(θ)
h1(θ)
,
that is, if h2(x)/h1(x) is strictly decreasing. Since h2(x) = −xh1(x) − h1(x)
2, h2(x)/h1(x) =
−x− h1(x), so (∂/∂x){h2(x)/h1(x)} = −1 − h2(x) < 0 for all x ∈ R. The latter claim follows
from the fact that 1 + h2(x) is the variance of a N(x, 1) distribution truncated to (0,∞). Since
g(θ; y) is strictly increasing, if used as a formal prior density for θ, it satisfies
Π(θ0|y) >
∫ θ0
−∞ g(θ; y)Φ(θ)
−1φ(θ − y)dθ∫∞
−∞ g(θ; y)Φ(θ)
−1φ(θ − y)dθ
.
But, by definition, g(θ; y) is such that
g(θ; y)
φ(θ − y)
Φ(θ)
=
∂
∂θ
H(θ, y),
so
Pθ0{Π(θ0|Y ) < α|Y > 0} > Pθ0{H(θ0, Y ) < α|Y > 0} = α,
since H(θ0, Y ) is uniformly distributed given selection.
For the second claim, let m(y) denote the posterior mode of θ given Y = y. We have that
∂
∂θ
log pi(θ|y) = y − θ − h1(θ).
Now, for all x > 0,
∂
∂θ
log pi(m(y)− x|y) +
∂
∂θ
log pi(m(y) + x|y)
= 2(y −m(y))− h1(m(y)− x)− h1(m(y) + x)
= 2h1(m(y)) − h1(m(y)− x)− h1(m(y) + x)
= x{h2(m(y)− x1)− h2(m(y) + x2)}
< 0,
where x1, x2 > 0. Here we have used that y = m(y) + h1(m(y)) and that h2(x) is strictly
increasing. Integrating this inequality we find that pi(m(y)+x|y) < pi(m(y)−x|y) for all x > 0.
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This implies that, for all α ≤ 1/2, Π−1(α|y) < m(y). We now show that m(y) + y−1 is bounded
in (0, k] for any positive k. To this end, let r(x) = x+ h1(x). Using L’Hoˆpital, we find
lim
x→−∞
1
r(x)
+ x = lim
x→−∞
Φ(x) + x2Φ(x) + xφ(x)
φ(x) + xΦ(x)
= 2 lim
x→−∞
φ(x) + xΦ(x)
Φ(x)
= 2 lim
x→−∞
Φ(x)
φ(x)
= 0.
The claimed boundedness follows from the change of variable x = m(y) and from noting that
m(y)→ −∞ as y → 0+. To conclude the proof, fix a k > 0 and write
∫ k
0
y−1φ(y − θ)dy ≤
∫ k
0
|Π−1(α|y)|φ(y − θ)dy
+
∫ k
0
|y−1 −Π−1(α|y)|φ(y − θ)dy.
Since the integral on the left diverges and the final one does not, it follows that
∫ k
0 |Π
−1(α|y)|φ(y−
θ)dy =∞, verifying the claim.
B Derivation of the probability-matching prior for 0 < γ < 1
Let Y = γY¯ (1)+(1−γ)Y¯ (2) and Y ⊥ = (1−γ)(Y¯ (1)−Y¯ (2)), which are uncorrelated, and therefore
independent. We have
p(y) = P(Y¯ (1) > t|Y = y)
= P(Y + Y ⊥ > t|Y = y)
= P(Y ⊥ > t− y)
= P(N(0, n−1(γ−1 − 1)) > t− y)
= Φ
{(
n
γ−1 − 1
)1/2
(y − t)
}
.
We also have that
ϕ(θ) = Pθ(Y¯
(1) > t) = Φ(n
1/2
1 (θ − t)).
The definition gives
piy(θ) ∝
1
φ(n1/2(y − θ))
{∫ ∞
y
n(y˜ − θ)φ(n1/2(y˜ − θ))p(y˜)dy˜
−
ϕ′(θ)
ϕ(θ)
∫ ∞
y
φ(n1/2(y˜ − θ))p(y˜)dy˜
}
.
(12)
Using that ∫
xφ(x)Φ(a+ bx)dx =
b
d
φ
(a
d
)
Φ
(
xt+
ab
d
)
− φ(x)Φ(a+ bx)
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for any constants a and b (see Owen (1980)), where d = (1 + b2)1/2, the first integral can be
expressed as
γ1/2φ(n
1/2
1 (θ − t))
{
1− Φ
{
n1/2
(1− γ)1/2
(y − θ + γ(θ − t))
}}
+φ(n1/2(y − θ))Φ
{
n
1/2
1
(1− γ)1/2
(y − t)
}
.
Substituting this expression in (12) and reorganising the terms gives the claimed expression.
C Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the result for the natural parameter θ to simplify the notation, but all the steps hold
for a generic parameter. Let us write
ϕn1(θ)
=Pθ
(
n1∑
i=1
s(Yi) > tn1
)
=Pθ
(
n1
1/2
A′′(θ)1/2
{
n1
−1
n1∑
i=1
s(Yi)−A
′(θ)
}
>
n1
1/2
A′′(θ)1/2
{
tn1
n1
−A′(θ)
})
≡Pθ
(
n1
1/2
A′′(θ)1/2
{
n1
−1
n1∑
i=1
s(Yi)−A
′(θ)
}
> hn1(θ)
)
.
By the Berry–Esseen theorem and Jensen’s inequality,
|ϕn1(θ)− [1− Φ{hn1(θ)}]| ≤
CEθ
[
|s(Y1)−A
′(θ)|3
]
n
1/2
1 A
′′(θ)3/2
≤
CA(6)(θ)1/2
n
1/2
1 A
′′(θ)3/2
for some positive constant C. Similarly,
ϕ˜n1(θ) = P
(
N
(
θ,
1
n1i(θ)
)
> (A′)−1
(
tn1
n1
))
= P
(
N(0, 1) > n
1/2
1 A
′′(θ)1/2
{
(A′)−1
(
tn1
n1
)
− θ
})
≡ P (N(0, 1) > gn1(θ)) .
Writing
tn1
n1
−A′(θ) = A′′(x)
{
(A′)−1
(
tn1
n1
)
− θ
}
,
where |x− θ| ≤ |(A′)−1(n−11 tn1)− θ| = {n1A
′′(θ)}−1/2|gn1(θ)|, we find that
hn1(θ)− gn1(θ) =
{
A′′(x)
A′′(θ)
− 1
}
gn1(θ).
Now, for any M > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1/4),
|Φ{hn1(θ)} − Φ{gn1(θ)}| = |Φ{hn1(θ)} − Φ{gn1(θ)}|1{|gn1(θ)| ≤Mn
γ
1}
+ |Φ{hn1(θ)} − Φ{gn1(θ)}|1{|gn1(θ)| > Mn
γ
1}.
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The first term vanishes uniformly in compact sets of θ, since
|hn1(θ)− gn1(θ)|1{|gn1(θ)| ≤Mn
γ
1} ≤∣∣∣∣A′′(x)−A′′(θ)A′′(θ)
∣∣∣∣ 1{|gn1(θ)| ≤Mnγ1}Mnγ1
and |x − θ| ≤ n
γ−1/2
1 {A
′′(θ)}−1/2M . For the second term, consider the case gn1(θ) < −Mn
γ
1 .
This implies that Φ{gn1(θ)} < Φ(−Mn
γ
1) = o(1) and Φ{hn1(θ)} < Φ(−MA
′′(θ)−1A′′(x)) = o(1)
uniformly in compact sets of θ. An analogous argument can be made for the case gn1(θ) > Mn
γ
1
to conclude that |Φ{hn1(θ)}−Φ{gn1(θ)}|, and therefore |ϕn1(θ)−ϕ˜n1(θ)| by the previous remark,
vanishes uniformly in compact sets of θ.
To conclude the proof of the first claim it suffices to show that ϕn1(θ0 + n
−1/2
1 t) is uniformly
bounded away from zero in bounded sets of t. Let Xn1(t) = log f(Y1, . . . , Yn1 ; θ0 + n
−1/2
1 t) −
log f(Y1, . . . , Yn1 ; θ0) and write
ϕn1(θ0 + n
−1/2
1 t)
ϕn1(θ0)
= Eθ0
[
eXn1 (t)|Sn1
]
≥ eEθ0 [Xn1(t)|Sn1 ],
where Sn1 denotes the selection event, and we have again used Jensen’s inequality. It therefore
suffices to show boundedness of |Eθ0 [Xn1(t)|Sn1 ]|. Taylor’s theorem gives
Eθ0 [Xn1(t)] = n
1/2
1 tA
′(θ0)− n1{A(θ0 + n
−1/2
1 t)−A(θ0)}
= tε1A
′′(θ0 + n
−1/2
1 ε2),
where |εi| ≤ t for i = 1, 2. Also, Varθ0(Xn1(t)) = t
2A′′(θ0). These two facts, combined with the
assumption that ϕn1(θ0) is bounded away from zero, imply the result, since
|Eθ0 [Xn1(t)|Sn1 ]− Eθ0 [Xn1(t)]|
= |Eθ0 [Xn1(t)− Eθ0 [Xn1(t)]|Sn1 ]|
=
|Eθ0 [{Xn1(t)− Eθ0 [Xn1(t)]}1(
∑n1
i=1 s(Yi) > tn1)]|
ϕn1(θ0)
≤
Eθ0 [|Xn1(t)− Eθ0 [Xn1(t)]|]
ϕn1(θ0)
≤
Varθ0(Xn1(t))
1/2
ϕn1(θ0)
.
To prove the last claim we need to show that Pθ0(θˆ1 ≤ x|θˆ1 > an1) − Gn1(x) converges uni-
formly to zero, where an1 = (A
′)−1(n−11 tn1). This is true because Pθ0(an1 < θˆ1 ≤ x)− P(an1 <
N(θ0, (n1i(θ0))
−1) ≤ x) converges uniformly to zero, which holds because the distribution func-
tions of n
1/2
1 (θˆ1 − θ0) converge uniformly to the standard normal distribution function in the
non-selective model, and because ϕn1(θ0)− ϕ˜n1(θ0)→ 0, which we have just shown.
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D Exponential model simulation
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Figure 5: Exponential model results (example 4.1). Coverage of the interval
(−∞,Π−1(α|Y1, . . . , Yn)] as a function of α for the non-selective Jeffreys prior (red), the
probability-matching prior (orange), and the selective Jeffreys prior (green). The orange lines
partially overlap the green ones.
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E Inverse Gaussian simulation
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Figure 6: Inverse Gaussian model results (example 4.2). Coverage of the interval
(−∞,Π−1(α|Y1, . . . , Yn)] as a function of α for the non-selective Jeffreys prior (red), the
probability-matching prior (orange), and the selective Jeffreys prior (green). The orange lines
partially overlap the green ones.
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